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Abstract The countries belonging to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) of
the EU are characterized by significant socioeconomic transformations and—more
recently—by disconcerting instances of social and political turmoil. This comes to
add to social and economic pressures applied to these countries under their process of
market liberalization and economic integration, instigated at least in part by the very
ENP process. In those conditions, questions of spatial cohesion and thus of regional
convergence and divergence become increasingly salient, as the elimination of (social
and) spatial imbalances is both a precondition for the legitimacy and successful imple-
mentation of the reforms aiming at market liberalization and economic integration and
a core objective of such reforms. In this paper, we examine the spatial dynamics of
population growth in the ENP countries prior to the recent destabilization in the region,
using two complementary approaches—an analysis of the impact of agglomeration on
growth and an analysis of club formation in population concentrations (convergence–
divergence). We find that, on the whole, the ENPCs South space was characterized in
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recent years by evidence of regional convergence in the sense that population concen-
trations were becoming more diffused across regions; while the ENPCs East exhibited
stronger andmore consistent evidence of regional divergence (increased concentration
of population). These findings suggest that agglomeration and cumulative causation
forces are more strongly in operation in the more advanced, at least in terms of EU
relations, countries of the ENP East, where also the “pull” factor of the EU economy
is stronger.
JEL Classification C13 · C14 · R11 · R12
1 Introduction
The recent European Union (EU) enlargements brought the borders of the EU to a set
of countries in the East with historically less intensive economic relations and little
experience with democratic capitalism. These countries have been part of the (former)
Soviet Union and are characterized by lower development levels and significant insti-
tutional and structural weaknesses. At the same time, in the Southern and the Eastern
rim of the Mediterranean Sea, the EU is faced with countries that are facing their own
challenges with regard to economic and democratic transition and which are histor-
ically linked to individual EU countries through their colonial past. Both bordering
areas, in the EU East and the EU South, have been gaining significance as they include
emerging economies, energy suppliers, or, simply, a large neighboring market, which
is crucial for the EU economy. More importantly, perhaps, they have been gaining
significance for security reasons, including in relation to illegal migration and the
control of international terrorism and, more recently, the refugee crisis. In response
to these, the EU launched, in 2004, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), a
unified policy framework toward its neighboring countries (the ENPCs), laying in
the external EU periphery, aiming at strengthening prosperity, stability and security
around its geo-political borders (EC 2004, 2010, 2011, inter alia). The policy covers
six countries of the “eastern” neighborhood (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Moldova andUkraine—the ENPCsEast) and ten countries of the “southern” neighbor-
hood (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian
Territory (Palestine), Syria and Tunisia—the ENPCs South). Recent developments in
the region (i.e., Ukrainian crisis, Libya and Syria wars) saw the revision of the ENP
framework with a shift of focus to security and societal issues (human trafficking,
anti-radicalization, youth unemployment) aiming not only at economic stabilization
but also at addressing social and political destabilization (Monastiriotis and Borrell
2013; EC 2015). This is especially in response to the sociopolitical turmoil that has
engulfed some of these countries, especially after the short period of optimism fol-
lowing the so-called Arab Spring, and which has resulted in significant and sometimes
extreme populationmovements both inside (Ukraine) and outside (Syria) their borders.
Partly motivated by these significant social and demographic changes, in this paper
we take a step back and seek to examine the dynamics of population growth within
each of the ENP countries prior to recent turmoil. Borrowing from the urban eco-
nomics literature, but applied here at the regional level (partly due to data limitations),
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we look at one particular influence on population change, namely the role of agglom-
eration. We examine specifically whether sub-national population change responds
positively or negatively to agglomeration (measured as population density), i.e., in
ways that reinforce or instead equalize population concentrations across space. This
question has a relevance which goes beyond the demographic interest per se. In the
absence of good quality (or, sometimes, any) sub-national level income data, examin-
ing processes of concentration and de-concentration of population can also shed light
on questions concerning economic convergence/divergencemore generally. Although,
admittedly, interest in spatial patterns of disparity is generally associated to variables
measuring income and welfare, the analysis of the spatial dynamics of population con-
centration is important both in itself and in the sense of understanding wider economic
processes (Duranton and Puga 2014). Indeed, scholars both in the urban economics
(Fujita 1988; Heslsey and Strange 1990; Glaeser 1999; Duranton and Puga 2001) and
the growth economics tradition (Lucas 1988;Glaeser et al. 1995) havewell-recognized
that studying population growth offers a window throughwhich to study the process of
economic growth as the latter is systematically related to population growth through
the trade-off between agglomeration economies and urban (i.e., commuting, housing,
land use, environmental, inter alia) costs. This is especially so in the context of the
ENP space, in particular, given that productivity levels, capital deepening and levels
of technology in these countries are still low and thus economic growth is still very
much of the extensive (increase in inputs, including labor) than the intensive form
(increase in the productivity of each input and in total factor productivity). More-
over, given that the vast majority of these countries are still at low levels of economic
development, spatial productivity differentials are predominantly along the lines of
urban-rural (core–periphery) dichotomy (Harris and Todaro 1970; Galor and Weil
2000; Hansen and Prescott 2002; Lucas 2004; Henderson and Wang 2005), and thus
very much related to patterns of population agglomeration (urbanization). In these
conditions, measures of spatial disparity in population concentration act as a lower
bound indicator of spatial disparities in economic activity and wealth. Thus, by exam-
ining how agglomeration influences population growth across space—irrespective of
whether this is instigated by migration or natural movements—we also obtain some
insight into how agglomeration influences economic growth across regions in these
countries.
Irrespective, however, of the question as to how well spatial inequalities in popula-
tion growth reflect disparities in economic indicators (e.g., regional GDP per capita),
examining the dynamics of the former—and whether they reflect cumulative or equi-
librating tendencies—is of acute analytical and policy interest in itself. If patterns
of population growth are found to be cumulative across space, this could be taken
as a signal of a wider spatial disequilibrium in these countries, representing spatial
inequalities in economic opportunities more generally. The latter would in turn raise
concerns about social and economic cohesion in these countries and ultimately about
the support to—and legitimacy of—processes of market liberalization and economic
integration, including those instigated directly by the EU’s policy in the region under
the ENP framework. This is especially important because, as the literature has shown
in relation to the experience of previous EU association waves, spatial imbalances
are often accentuated by processes of deeper association and integration with the EU
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(Neven 1995; Quah 1996; Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004; Barrios and Strobl 2009;
Petrakos et al. 2011; Monastiriotis 2014; Monastiriotis et al. 2016, inter alia). As a
corollary, accentuated spatial disparities (both in incomes and in perceived economic
opportunities), and the legitimacy questions that they may raise, can act as an impedi-
ment to the ability of the EU to stimulate, and pursue, effective democratization in its
neighborhood. Thus, either as a possible side-effect of integration or as a precondi-
tion for its success, the extent of regional disparities and imbalances in the associated
countries matters.
Nevertheless, explained to a large extent by the absence of suitable data and espe-
cially data that would be comparable across countries, the literature has so far only
offered very limited insights into these questions of spatial disparities and their dynam-
ics in theENP space.Among the handful of exceptions, the paper byPeridy et al. (2013)
stands out as perhaps the most comprehensive study to date to examine questions of
regional convergence for a group of ENPCs. Specifically, the authors use regional-
ized GDP data from the Yale University GEcon3.3 dataset project to study spatial
dependence as well as conditional and unconditional convergence at the sub-national
level for a sub-set of MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries. Although this
is a welcome contribution to what is, largely, an unexplored topic, their reliance on
artificially constructed regional units on the basis of “1-degree latitude by 1-degree lon-
gitude terrestrial grid cells” makes their empirical findings somewhat less relevant for
understanding the actual special-economic dynamics underpinning the growth process
of these countries’ actual regional economies. Besides this, a limited number of studies
have examined patterns of regional disparities for a select few number of countries
for which better-quality data exist (e.g., Demchuck and Zelenyuk 2009; Kokko and
Kravtsova 2012; Kallioras and Tsiapa 2015 for Ukraine; Lipshitz and Raveh 1998;
Portnov and Erell 2004; Beenstock and Felsenstein 2008 for Israel; Petrakos et al.
2016 for Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Israel and Ukraine).
In this context, the analysis presented in this paper makes, we believe, an important
contribution to our knowledge and understanding of spatial processes in the ENP
region. To perform our analysis, we take two complementary steps. First, we specify
a simple equation which makes population growth a function of population density.
We treat this as an insight model for the relationship between agglomeration and
growth, a relationship that has been examined widely and under a variety of settings in
the spatial economics literature (see, inter alia, Cheshire and Magrini 2000; Brülhart
and Sbergami 2009; Boschma et al. 2012). We note that although the intuition of
the model derives from the literature of the economics of agglomeration (Marshalian
externalities, knowledge spillovers, etc.—see Glaeseret al. 1991; Coombes 2000) its
form is equivalent to a simple (unconditional) convergence model specified in terms of
population densities. Geared with the empirical evidence collected from this analysis
and the similarity in form to the convergence hypothesis, we then move on to perform
a more detailed analysis of club convergence, using the methodology developed by
Chatterji (1992) and Chatterji and Dewhurst (1996) which examines the temporal
dynamics of each region’s distance from a national frontier.
In both cases of the empirical analysis, we find evidence of diffusion of agglomer-
ations, or of convergence, only in a minority of countries and regions. On the whole,
the ENPCs South space is characterized by evidence of diffusion of agglomerations
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(convergence), while the ENPCs East exhibits stronger and more consistent evidence
of regional concentration (divergence). Our results suggest that agglomeration and
cumulative causation forces are more strongly in operation in the more advanced, at
least in terms of EU relations, countries of the ENP East, where also the “pull” factor
of the EU economy is stronger. In contrast, in parts of the ENPCs South we find that
agglomeration forces play a limited role and thus that centripetal tendencies of diver-
gence are scarcer and weaker. These findings, besides their academic interest more
generally, provide significant implications as regards EU policy in the ENPCs—an
issue that we touch upon in the concluding section. Before that, in the next section we
present some basic descriptive information on our sample of ENPCs regions and the
details of our empirical approach. Sections 3 and 4 present, respectively, our empirical
analysis on the impact of agglomeration on population growth and on the possibility
for the emergence of regional convergence clubs at the sub-national level. As noted
above, the last section concludes with some implications for policy.
2 Descriptive patterns and empirical approach
In our empirical analysis,we use data derived from the SEARCHDatabase1 (SEARCH
2013), which includes population data at the regional level (which is comparable to
EU NUTS II spatial level) for the full sample of ENP countries.2 The period covered
by our data is broadly the period from the late 1990s to the early 2010s. It should be
noted that our pooled sample pools together a cross section of regions across countries,
for which data on average annual population growth rates and initial year population
densities cover slightly different periods (e.g., 2000–2011 in Armenia, 1998–2008 in
Algeria). Although this may seem as a limitation, we make no claim that these periods
are strictly homogenous across countries (e.g., in terms of their political, demographic
and economic development). In fact, this would not hold true even in the case that our
data were covering exactly the same start and end years for each of the countries under
analysis. Instead, we treat this broad period as a phase which is broadly homogenous
in terms of the development of relations of these countries with the EU, i.e., a phase
starting after the establishment of the Barcelona Process in the south and the wave of
the post-communist transitions in the east and ending at the time of the Arab Spring
in the south and before the recent turmoil that has hit parts of the EU neighborhood
in both the east and the south (i.e., Ukraine crisis, Syrian War). Table 1 presents the
list of countries and periods of our data coverage.
It should come as no surprise that the distribution of population, and of population
densities, in the ENPCs is highly skewed. As is typical with countries of lower levels of
development (Berry 1961; El-Shakhs 1972; Wheaton and Shishido 1981; Parr 1985;
Petrakos and Brada 1989; Ades and Glaeser 1995; Henderson 2002), a pattern of
metropolitan dominance seems to characterize much of the ENPCs economic space.
1 SEARCHdatabase compiled within the framework of the homonymous FP7 Research Project. See http://
www.ub.edu/searchproject/ for further details.
2 Palestine is not included in the analysis due to the lack of data. Also, Libya is not included in the analysis
since we have data for only one year (i.e., 2006).
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Table 1 Population data
description Sources: SEARCH
(2013)/authors’ elaboration
a Abkhazia is not included
b Judea and Samaria area is not
included
Country Period covered Number of regions
Armenia 2000–2011 11
Azerbaijan 2000–2012 11
Belarus 2001–2012 7
Georgiaa 2002–2012 11
Moldova 2005–2012 5
Ukraine 2000–2012 27
Algeria 1998–2008 48
Egypt 1996–2012 27
Israelb 2000–2010 6
Jordan 2000–2011 11
Lebanon 2004–2007 6
Morocco 2003–2009 16
Syria 2004–2011 14
Tunisia 2004–2011 24
Indeed, inmost of the ENPCs, the capital regions exhibit the highest population density
figures. Nevertheless, this does not apply to all ENPCs. In parts of the ENPCs South
sub-group (particularly, Egypt, Israel, Jordan andMorocco), the capital regions are not
the ones exhibiting the highest population density figures. Still, even in these cases,
population density in the main metropolitan region of each country is many times
higher than the corresponding average and minimum figures in each country’s other
regions. Indeed, for many non-metropolitan regions a situation of desolation emerges
at least in some parts of the ENPCs—especially in countries such as Georgia, Algeria,
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, where there are regions with extremely low
population density figures.
These patterns are summarized in Table 2, which depicts some basic population
density data for the administrative regions of the ENPCs. Specifically, Table 2 shows
the minimum, average and maximum population density figures for each ENPC, at
the regional level. As can be seen, average population densities vary significantly
across the ENPCs, ranging from over 3300 inh./sq. km in Lebanon to less than 200
inhabitants per square kilometer in Azerbaijan. Within-country disparities are even
more pronounced—not so much in the ENPCs East, where max-to-min ratio ranges
between 15 (in Moldova) and 200 (in Armenia and Belarus), as in the ENPCs South,
where max-to-min ratios take extreme values as high as 20,000 (in Algeria).3
Although such extreme disparities are to an extent to be expected, given the physical
geography of the countries concerned4, they also raise interesting questions about the
3 This holds even though the main metropolitan regions in the ENPCs East exhibit (among) the highest
population (density) growth rate(s), while, correspondingly, this is not exactly the case in the ENPCs South
(cf. Tables A1.1–A.1.14 in the supplemental data online).
4 The physical geography of the ENPCs poses a caveat for our analysis that we have not been able to
remedy. Specifically, it is possible that population in regions that include large sections of desert may
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Table 2 Population density data by country Sources: SEARCH (2013)/authors’ elaboration
Years Population density (inh./sq. km)
Minimum Average Maximum Maximum/Minimum
Armenia 2011 24.26 (Vayots Dzor) 529.63 4942.29 (Yerevan) 203.72
Azerbaijan 2012 36.39
(Kalbajar-Lachin)
169.62 996.38 (Baku) 27.38
Belarus 2012 30.28 (Vitebsk) 914.82 6180.66 (Minsk city) 204.12
Georgiaa 2012 9.69
(Racha-Lechkhumi
and Kvemo Svaneti)
211.54 1675.29 (Tbilisi
municipality)
172.89
Moldova 2012 73.02 (Sud/Þã/South) 299.94 1135.43 (Municipiul
Chis¸ina˘u)
15.55
Ukraine 2012 34.19 (Chernuhiv) 207.89 3352.23 (City of
Kiev)
98.05
Algeria 2008 0.18 (Illizi) 224.48 3693.63 (Alger) 20, 520.17
Egypt 2012 0.47 (El Wadi El
Gidid)
808.66 4229.54 (Kaliobia) 8999.02
Israelb 2010 78.03 (HaDarom) 1978.19 7470.93 (Tel Aviv) 95.74
Jordan 2011 3.69 (Ma’an) 225.47 707.57 (Irbid) 191.75
Lebanon 2007 117.73 (Bekaa
Governorate)
3322.52 18,250.81 (Beirut
Governorate)
155.02
Morocco 2009 3.37 (Oued Ed-
Dahab-Lagouira)
321.13 3687.13 (Grand
Casablanca)
1094.10
Syria 2011 36.93 (Deir-ez-Zor) 1354.87 16,619.05 (Damascus) 450.01
Tunisia 2011 3.81 (TaTaouine) 302.07 2898.55 (Tunis) 760.77
a Abkhazia is not included
b Judea and Samaria area is not included
Footnote 4 continued
be much more densely concentrated (in cities) than our measurement may imply. A similar problem would
emerge if the regions of our analysis included a heterogeneous number of large cities: In this case, it
is possible that population density at the regional level could appear higher in multi-city regions with
cities of lower agglomeration (population density), thus biasing our measurement of agglomeration at the
regional level. In the absence of accurate city-level population data, our approach for both possible biases
was to check on a country-by-country basis and examine (a) to what extent desert regions included cities
with densities comparable to those of non-desert regions (b) to what extent the regions of study had a
heterogeneous number of large cities. Our exploratory analysis assured us that the bias introduced by our
approach to measure population density at the region, than city, level was not particularly sizeable. Still
the possibility of a bias remains. In this sense, the results presented in our analysis should be treated with
caution as they are likely to present upper-bound estimates of the true extent of convergence/divergence
in population densities. In any case, however, the bias concerns the extent rather than the direction of the
identified effects.
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role of equilibrating (centrifugal) or cumulative (centripetal) forces and of agglom-
eration as a “pull” factor for population growth, in particular. To examine these, we
perform two sets of analysis.We start with a simple analysis of the impact of agglomer-
ation on population growth.Various strands of the literature have examined empirically
this relationship, while a large theoretical literature also exists, following within the
traditions of new economic geography and urban / spatial economics, which provide
analytical support to this relationship.5 Empirical studies of the role of agglomeration
on regional growth typically specify agglomeration on the basis of measures of density
(Crescenzi et al. 2007; Dall and Schmidt 2015): Population density is central in this,
often combined with other measures capturing different aspects of agglomeration,
such as product variety and diversity (Boschma et al. 2012), spatial concentration of
industrial activity (Brülhart and Sbergami 2009), concentration of human capital and
entrepreneurship (Braunerhjelm and Borgman 2004), R&D and economic potential
(Cheshire and Magrini 2000) and others. In our analysis, we follow this literature and
specify a simple regional growth equation where population growth is a function of
agglomeration (measured by population density). Specifically,
p˙r,t = α + βAr,t−1 (1)
where p˙r,t is population growth in region r in year t ; Ar,t−1 measures population
density (A = P/L , where L is a region’s fixed area) in region r in the period t − 1;
and α and β are model parameters. It needs to be noted that, as L is fixed over time,
Eq. (1) is directly analogous (fully equivalent) empirically to a simple unconditional
convergence equation specified in terms of population densities. Specifically,
p˙r,t = ln (P)r,t − ln (P)r,t−1 − ln (L)r + ln (L)r
= ln
(
P
L
)
r,t
− ln
(
P
L
)
r,t−1
= A˙r,t = α + βAr,t−1 (2)
In this sense, the estimate of β in Eq. (1) can be discussed in terms of a conver-
gence/divergence process: A negative β suggests that population densities converge
over time, so that relatively sparsely populated / low agglomeration regions catch-up to
the more urbanized / higher agglomeration ones; a positive β suggests that population
densities diverge over time. To put it differently, a positive β shows that agglomeration
contributes positively to population growth, and thus that high agglomeration regions
become disproportionately more dense (high agglomeration) over time (implying
5 See Baldwin and Martin (2004) for a detailed exposition of this thretical tradition. See also Sveikauskas
(1975) and Beeson (1987) for earlier treatments of the same issue.
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regional divergence in population densities); a negative β shows that agglomerations
tend to subside over time and thus that regional population sizes converge.6, 7
Following this analysis, in a second stage we delve deeper into the patterns of
convergence and divergence in the ENPCs sub-groups by examining the possibility
for the emergence of regional convergence clubs within each of the countries of our
analysis. Broadly speaking, the notion of club convergence implies convergence to a
common level only for (regional) economies that are both identical in their structural
characteristics and similar in their initial conditions (see Quah 1993). In other words,
convergence within each club allows for aggregate divergence or for divergence across
clubs. In our empirical analysis of club convergence, we follow the approach proposed
by Chatterji (1992) and Chatterji and Dewhurst (1996). This requires the identification
of a lead economy (i.e., an economy that exhibits the highest value as regards the
variable of population density, in particular), relating the gap (i.e., the difference
between the population density level of the lead economy and the population density
level of each of the economies under consideration, including the leading one) at one
date with the corresponding gap at an earlier date, including further powers of those
earlier levels. Particularly, the investigation for the emergence of regional convergence
clubs is based on the econometric estimation of the equation:
GFr =
K∑
k=1
γk
(
GBr
)k
(3)
where B denotes the base (initial) year of estimation, F denotes the final year of
estimation, r denotes region, G denotes the gap (in logarithmic terms), γ (1, 2, . . ., K )
is the coefficient of G, and k(1, 2, . . ., K ) are the powers of G. Allowing in this way
higher powers of the “initial gap” variable allows us to identify groups of regions that
belong to different “convergence clubs”. This is done in relation to a benchmark linear
function of the form GF = GB . The intersections between this benchmark function
and the function estimated from the convergence clubs analysis point out the initial
gap levels that correspond to equal final gap levels (i.e., there is neither convergence
nor divergence).
6 The constancy of Lmeans also that Eq. (1) is analogous empirically to a simple unconditional convergence
equation specified in terms of population growth—this time with a space-varying convergence coefficient.
Specifically, substituting A = P/L into Eq. (1) gives. Interpreting this relation as a convergence equation
implies that, for <0 regional populations convergence to a common steady-state, albeit at different paces,
with the pace of convergence being uniquely influenced by each region’s land area. This is equivalent to a
standard convergence equation with region-specific slope coefficients (rates of convergence), of the form.
It is obvious that the two equations are identical for. It follows that, empirically, estimating a population
convergence equation can give us an estimate of the impact of population density on population growth
(assuming that land areas are known). Analytically, however, our estimating relation (Eq. 1) attributes a
role to agglomeration (density) which is not found in the convergence equation.
7 Of course, one cannot entirely exclude the possibility that the negative β coefficient may depict unsyn-
chronized phases of demographic change among different type of regions that are associated with a different
spatial timing in the acceleration of population growth. We thank an anonymous Referee for this point.
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3 Agglomeration and (population) growth
As a starting point for our analysis of the impact of agglomeration on regional growth,
we examine the relationship depicted by Eq. (1) at a macroregional (supra-national)
level, first across the entireENPCsmacroregion and then separately for theENPCsEast
and the ENPCs South sub-groups. We do so both in a simple OLS setting, pooling all
regions and countries together, and in a fixed effects setting, which includes country-
specific dummies (fixed effects), which thus allow for different population growth
trajectories in each of the ENPCs included in the analysis. At a second stage, the
analysis is replicated for each ENPC separately in order to examine the stability of
the region-wide results across countries and to produce country-specific evidence of
the impact that agglomeration has on growth. Table 3 reports the results from the
region-wide analyses, and Table 4 summarizes the country-specific results.
As can be seen in the first column of Table 3, the relation between agglomera-
tion (population density) and regional growth (in population terms) across the entire
ENPCs macroregion is statistically significant (at the 1% level) and consistent with
the evidence of convergence: Increasing a region’s population density by 1% point
reduces the predicted annual growth rate by almost 0.3% points. In other words, more
sparsely populated regions are found to have been growing faster during the period,
and thus catching-up in terms of their population density with the higher agglomera-
tion regions. The overall fit of the regression, however, is very small (adj. R2 of 0.07).
Adding country-specific fixed effects (so as to account for country-specific trends in
population growth) to this specification increases the fit of the regression substantially
(adj. R2 of 0.43) but affects little the estimated elasticity of the agglomeration variable.
Nevertheless, as is shown in the remainder of Table 3, this result is not homogeneous
across the ENPCs sub-groups. In the ENPCs South sub-group (columns 3 and 5), the
evidence of convergence is maintained and, indeed, somewhat strengthened, with the
coefficient of the population density variable rising to around -0.35%. In contrast, in
the ENPCs East sub-group (columns 4 and 6) the elasticity of growth to agglomer-
ation becomes positive and remains, as before, highly significant statistically (at the
1% level). Quite clearly, in these countries the evidence points to (statistically) strong
centripetal forces that lead to regional divergence—with high-density regions experi-
encing faster population growth and thus further strengthening of their agglomeration.
As before, the result is consistent irrespective of whether country-specific fixed effects
are included or not.
This finding is of particular interest, and it is consistent with debates elsewhere
in the ENP literature (Whitman and Wolff 2010; Fritz-Vannahme and Schöler 2015,
inter alia) about the heterogeneity of the EU neighborhood. Specifically, the results
reported in Table 3 point to two very different trajectories in relation to the operation
of agglomeration forces in the two ENPCs sub-groups, with cumulative causation type
of effects dominating in the ENPCs East but a clear evidence of convergence in the
ENPCs South. Although we have no way of testing empirically the causes underlying
these different trajectories, it should be noted that these are consistent with the general
view in the literature, which suggests that countries that are in closer economic and
political association with the EU (as is typical for the ENPCs East sub-group) tend
to experience a widening of regional disparities partly as a result of the cumulative
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Table 4 Agglomeration and regional growth: country-specific regressions Sources: SEARCH
(2013)/authors’ elaboration
Ln(population growth) Constant Ln(population density) Obs. Adj. R2
Armenia 0.000158 0.000916 11 0.036
(2000–2011) (0.00759) (0.00158)
Azerbaijan 0.00693 0.00116 11 0.040
(2000–2012) (0.00863) (0.00190)
Georgiaa −0.0149** 0.00350*** 11 0.542
(2002–2012) (0.00474) (0.00107)
Ukraine −0.0222*** 0.00347*** 27 0.463
(2000–2012) (0.00342) (0.000747)
Algeria 0.0311*** −0.00330*** 48 0.510
(1998–2008) (0.00211) (0.000477)
Egypt 0.0395*** −0.00295*** 27 0.287
(1996–2012) (0.00514) (0.000931)
Jordan 0.0240*** −0.000190 11 0.106
(2000–2011) (0.000807) (0.000174)
Morocco 0.0987 −0.0183*** 16 0.453
(2003–2009) (0.0245) (0.00538)
Syria 0.0321*** −0.00162 14 0.188
(2004–2011) (0.00512) (0.000971)
Tunisia −0.000114 0.00216** 24 0.203
(2004–2011) (0.00437) (0.000912)
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
a Abkhazia is not included
causation forces triggeredby the “EUpull” (Kallioras andPetrakos 2010;Monastiriotis
2014; Monastiriotis et al. 2016, inter alia).
To examine further the validity of such an interpretation, and more generally to
examine the stability of the above result across the different ENPCs, in Table 4 we
present country-specific estimates of themodel depicted byEq. (1).Overall, the finding
about a general differentiation between the ENPCs East and the ENPCs South sub-
groups holds also at the country level. In the ENPCs East sub-group, evidence of
divergence is found in all cases, albeit this is statistically significant only in Georgia
andUkraine (in Armenia andAzerbaijan it fails the significance test at the 10% level).8
In contrast, in the ENPCs South sub-group, the obtained coefficients in all but one case
8 Evidence of divergence is also obtained for Belarus (significant at 1%) andMoldova (not significant), but
as these estimates are based on samples of less than 10 regions these results are not reported here. Similarly,
in the ENPCs South sample we also get evidence of convergence additionally for Lebanon (significant at
5%) and Israel (not significant), but these results are also excluded from Table 4.
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point to regional convergence: statistically significant inAlgeria, Egypt andMorocco;9
statistically nonsignificant in Jordan and Syria; and only pointing toward divergence
(significant at the 5% level) in the case of Tunisia.
All in all, the findings reported inTables 3 and 4 provide strong evidence that the role
of agglomeration is very different in the two sub-groups of ENPCs. In the ENPCs East
sub-group, there seems to be clear evidence of regional divergence or, as a corollary,
evidence that agglomeration forces are in operation. Although the presence of a diver-
gence dynamic may be seen as a negative trend for the countries concerned, it should
also be noted that the evidence of significant positive agglomeration effects implies
that these countries have stronger conditions for national growth as the cumulative
strengthening of agglomerations naturally allows for a greater productivity potential
to be realized. In contrast, in most of the ENPCs South sub-group, agglomerations
seem not to be characterized by cumulative forces: although this leads to evidence of
regional convergence (in population sizes), it is also a sign of weakness with regard
to the forces that can stimulate productivity and growth at the national level. The
implication is that these economies may be in a trajectory that affords them a low-
ering of spatial disparities (regional convergence) but within a context of weakening
preconditions for national growth and, thus, catch-up convergence supra-nationally.
4 Population growth and club formation
Moving on to the econometric investigation for the emergence of regional convergence
clubs, a couple of remarks have to be made first. The specification depicted in Eq. (3)
endangers the possibility of considerable multicollinearity between the various pow-
ers of the independent variable, which in turn makes difficult the choice of the best
parsimonious estimation. For this reason, the final selection on the specification of the
equations was made under the rule of dropping the statistically nonsignificant terms
and—in cases when two or more equations had statistically significant coefficients—
with respect to the (lowest) AIC (Akaike 1973). All equations have been estimated
in an OLS setting, providing for heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White
1980). The results from this analysis10 are presented in Table 5 and visualized in
Fig. 1.11
As can be seen, the convergence clubs analysis points to a consolidated spatial
pattern in the vast majority of ENPCs (i.e., relative stability in spatial differences over
time). Statistically, evidence of club formation (in that the nonlinear terms of the ini-
9 Peridy et al. (2013) find no evidence of (conditional) convergence in Morocco and Egypt. Given that our
specification and data, as well as units of analysis, differ quite substantially to those of Peridy et al. (2013),
it is not appropriate to make a direct comparison of the results of the two studies. We note, however, that
the difference in results, and in their policy implications, points to the need for more work to be done on
the topic—a direction in which we hope this paper contributes to.
10 Belarus, Moldova, Lebanon and Israel are excluded from Table 5 due to small regional samples.
11 As discussed previously, convergence clubs equations suffer, by nature, fromhigh level ofmulticollinear-
ity (cf. Table A2 in the supplemental data online for the presentation of the Variance Inflation Factors). Yet,
so long as the underlying specifications are correct, the high level of multicollinearity does not actually bias
results. The problem is that, in case of high level multicollinearity, when the coefficients of the convergence
clubs models are used for prediction purposes, large errors may produce (Chatterjeeet al. 2000).
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Table 5 Gap persistence and club formation Sources: SEARCH (2013)/authors’ elaboration
Final gap Initial gap ∧ 1 Initial gap ∧ 2 Initial gap ∧ 3 Obs. Adj. R2
Armenia 1.014675*** 11 0.997325
(2000–2011) (0.00579)
Azerbaijan 1.007762*** 11 0.995367
(2000–2012) (0.006425)
Georgiaa 1.003146*** 0.015041* 11 0.999171
(2002–2012) (0.009736) (0.007045)
Ukraine 1.042690*** 27 0.998136
(2000–2012) (0.002092)
Algeria 1.017018*** −0.010443*** 48 0.988972
(1998–2008) (0.005967) (0.002507)
Egypt 1.117227*** −0.120831** 0.022210** 27 0.993948
(1996–2012) (0.049427) (0.047984) (0.009764)
Jordan 0.998263*** 11 0.999963
(2000–2011) (0.001695)
Morocco 0.874294*** 0.149776** −0.043058*** 16 0.996601
(2003–2009) (0.066989) (0.064792) (0.013012)
Syria 0.988829*** 14 0.999440
(2004–2011) (0.002109)
Tunisia 0.863722*** 0.121867*** −0.026816*** 24 0.999696
(2004–2011) (0.026521) (0.027571) (0.006735)
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
a Abkhazia is not included
tial gap are statistically significant) is found for half of the ENPCs considered in the
analysis (Georgia, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia); while for the remaining five
countries we find evidence of universal convergence or divergence (i.e., a linear-only
relationship). InArmenia,Azerbaijan andUkrainewefind that all regions diverge from
the lead region (i.e., the final gap, in population density terms, is slightly higher as
compared to the respective gap in the initial year) without converging toward an equi-
librium gap level (there is no positive intersection of the fitted line with the benchmark
45◦ line) and thus divergence is consistent throughout the sample. However, consistent
with what we found in the analysis of the previous sub-section, only in Ukraine is the
estimated coefficient statistically different from one (and, in terms of Fig. 1, only there
does the fitted line deviate sufficiently from the 45◦ line) and thus only there is the
relationship one of divergence, rather than stability, in a statistical sense. Similarly,
in Jordan and Syria the evidence points toward universal converge (the fitted line is
below the 45◦ line), but the difference is not statistically significant. Again, this is
fully consistent with the findings of the previous sub-section. Finally, in the case of
Georgia, although a nonlinear relationship is found, the evidence is again pointing
to universal divergence—consistent with what was found in the previous sub-section
and fully in line with the evidence obtained for the other ENP East countries. This is
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Fig. 1 Convergence clubs regression results. Sources SEARCH (2013)/Authors’ elaboration
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because there is no positive intersection between the fitted line and the 45◦ line (the
quadratic term is positive and the linear term is above one), implying that all regions
are diverge both from the lead region and from one another.
For the remaining four countries, all belonging to the ENPCs South, the relationship
between initial and end-of-period gap is not only nonlinear but also produces an
intersection point with the 45◦ line. This means that in a statistical sense there is
evidence of club formation. In Algeria, 26 out of the 48 regions are found to diverge
from the lead region and to converge internally toward a club-specific equilibrium
given by the intersection between the fitted and benchmark lines (this corresponds at
an initial gap of 1.629). Notably, this club includes all coastal regions of the country. In
turn, the remaining 21 regions,12 which are all landlocked, are also found to converge
to the same equilibrium (at the aforementioned intersection) and, because of that,
also to be moving closer (converge) to the lead region. This means that all regions in
Algeria, with the exception of the lead region (Alger), converge within a single club;
while the lead region diverges, forming a club of its own. The large membership of
the convergence club explains the finding from the aggregate analysis of the previous
sub-section, where the evidence was in favor of convergence; but the analysis of this
sub-section shows that this pattern of convergence does not apply to the lead region,
which follows its own divergent path. An analogous picture is found for Egypt. In
this case, 16 out of the 27 regions appear to diverge from the lead region (the linear
term is above the value of one) and to converge toward a club-specific equilibrium
(as the quadratic term is negative, producing an intersection with the 45◦ line) that
corresponds to an initial gap of 1.263. The remaining 10 regions13 also converge to
that point and thus are also part of this large convergence club—although for them
the distance from the lead region is also reduced. Again, this is consistent with, but
also sheds more light to, the evidence of universal convergence found in the aggregate
analysis of the previous sub-section.
The cases ofMorocco andTunisia are different as here there are at least some regions
that converge with the “lead” convergence club. In Morocco, which also returned evi-
dence of convergence in our earlier analysis, the “lead” convergence club contains four
additional regions14 besides the lead region of Grand Casablanca. As all regions in
this club are coastal, it seems possible that the population growth dynamics observed
there may be at least to some extent related to their geography. A set of eight regions
diverges from this lead region club and converges internally to an equilibrium that cor-
responds to an initial gap of 2.063. Convergence to the same equilibrium characterizes
the remaining 3 regions.15 These are all border regions, which had the highest initial
gaps and thus their movement is convergent additionally to the “lead” club. In the case
12 These regions are: Mila, O. E. Bouaghi, S. B. Abbes, Msila, Saida, Tebessa, Tiaret, Khenchela, Biskra,
Langhouat, Djelfa, El Oued, Naama, Ghardaia, El Bayadh, Ouargla, Bechar, Adrar, Tamanrasset, Tindouf
and Illizi.
13 These regions are: Ismalia, Luxor, Menia, Suez, Aswan, North Sinai, South Sinai, Red Sea, Matrouh
and El Wadi El Gidid.
14 These regions are: Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer, Gharb-Chrarda-Béni Hssen, Tanger-Tétouan, and
Doukkala-Abda.
15 These regions are: Oriental, Guelmim-Es-Semara, and Oued Ed-Dahab-Lagouira.
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of Tunisia, the second convergence club, at an intersection point corresponding to an
initial gap of 2.558, contains only three (landlocked) regions.16 The remaining regions
converge jointly to the lead region, forming a large convergence club (21 out of 24
regions nationally). In this case, the result appears much different from that obtained
in our previous analysis, where we found strong evidence of divergence across the
sample. It should be noted, however, that despite the fact that these results are econo-
metrically strong (i.e., the nonlinear terms are statistically significant even at the 1%
level), as can be seen in Fig. 1 the evidence of club formation is not particularly strong
in economic terms: The distance of the fitted regression lines from the correspond-
ing benchmark 45◦ lines is hardly distinguishable in practically all cases (at least for
in-sample values).
Overall, then, the results from the club convergence analysis help us shedmore light
to the patterns of convergence and divergence unveiled in the analysis of the previous
sub-section, but they do not alter the obtained picture fundamentally. In a number of
cases, we find evidence of divergence (for Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)
or convergence (for Jordan and Syria) from the lead region which is consistent with,
and adds to, the overall pattern of divergence or convergence found in the aggregate
analysis. In other cases (Algeria and Egypt), the aggregate evidence of convergence
masks a force of separation (divergence) between the lead region and the rest of the
country; while in two other cases convergence to the lead region is strong, but there is
also a second club that is formed,which converges internally but diverges from the club
of the lead region. It thus appears that the simple story that emerged from our earlier
analysis—about a broader pattern of agglomeration-driven divergence in the ENPCs
East and of weak agglomeration effects and convergence in the ENPCs South—is only
part of the picture of the regional evolutions and dynamics in the ENPCs macroregion.
We discuss the implications of this finding in the concluding section.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
Given that the EU experience has shown that deeper association may coincide with
increasing spatial imbalances in growth performance levels, operating under “neigh-
borhood Europeanization” conditions raises a salient issue with respect to the spatial
pattern of growth in the ENPCs. Moreover, the recent turmoil and instability charac-
terizing parts of the region raises also questions about (social and) spatial cohesion
in these countries and thus about the extent of spatial imbalances there and of the
recent dynamics characterizing such imbalances. With these considerations in the
background, in this paper we analyzed the spatial population dynamics generated in
the ENPCs, putting special emphasis on agglomeration forces and on the dynamic
between population density and population growth, in particular.
Starting from a simple model of agglomeration and growth, we documented an
aggregate relationship of convergence whereby low-density regions experience on the
whole faster population growth. Underneath this aggregate pattern, however, we found
16 These regions are: Tozeur (which moves away from the “lead” club) and Kebili and TaTaouine (which
move closer to the lead region).
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clear evidence that the role of agglomeration is markedly different in the two main
sub-groups of the ENPCs macroregion. In the ENPCs, East sub-group agglomeration
forces are in operation, leading to regional divergence; whereas in the ENPCs South
sub-group agglomeration seems not to be characterized by cumulative forces. Still, in
both cases, significant disparities in agglomeration exist, in the form of—sometimes
huge—differentials in population densities across metropolitan and more peripheral
regions. The existence of such disparities poses a question concerning (their impact on)
the evolution of spatial patterns of growth in the ENPCs. As the ENPCs become more
associated with the EU structures and more open (politically and economically), the
(new) pressures that may emerge may concentrate disproportionately the generation
of growth in regions with conducive characteristics, such as high levels of population
density (i.e., agglomeration forces), thus leading to further regional divergence also
in the ENPCs South, similar to what is currently observed for the ENPCs East.
Taking this analysis further, we also examined the within-country stability of these
patterns, by investigating empirically the presence of convergence clubs in relation to
the growth trajectories of the leading agglomerations (most densely populated regions)
in each of the countries covered by our analysis. Employing themethod of convergence
clubs, we found evidence of an unbalanced spatial pattern of growth, in population
density terms, at least for a sub-set of the ENPCs. In the countries belonging to the
ENPCs East sub-group, a clear trend of divergencewas detected also in relation to their
national lead region; in the ENPCs South sub-group, in contrast, convergence trends
were typically more complex, with various instances of club formation coexisting with
aggregate patterns of convergence (e.g., in Morocco) and divergence (e.g., in Tunisia).
Given that the ENPCs are not fully developed and are, typically, characterized
by nonexistent or poorly-designed and under-funded regional policies, these spatial
dynamics and imbalances may be an issue of serious concern in the immediate and
medium-term future. Arguably, the reported results cover a specific period of substan-
tial change in the ENP region, whichmay have nevertheless been put on a significantly
different path, for at least a subset of these countries, following the developments
that have followed the Arab Spring (e.g., in countries like Egypt and Syria) and the
Ukrainian 2014 revolution. In this sense, we cannot claim that our results show long-
run dynamics and prospects that apply today equally as they did in the first decade
of the century. However, even if the patterns we reveal may be seen as temporary
and/or specific to the period for which the analysis is performed, they are nevertheless
indicative at least of some underlying tendencies that may persist, or reappear, in the
future.
With this caveat in mind, our results would seem to call—at least for those parts
of the ENPCs macroregion for which clear and multifaceted evidence of divergence
was found—for a set of comprehensive, well-targeted and carefully-designed policy
interventions, including on behalf of the EU, that would seek to enhance the economic
potential of lagging-behind regions in the EU periphery and in this way help these
regions to maximize the gains that they can derive from the prospective further inte-
gration of their countries with the EU. On the other hand, the derived evidence of
centrifugal (convergence) tendencies can also be seen as a sign of the benign function-
ing of agglomeration forces, which can act as a trigger for national growth in a process
of economic catch-upwith the EU core—the benefits ofwhich could potentially trickle
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down to the less developed and less populous regions in the future. In this sense, the
policy challenge for the national and European policy-makers may be a short-term
equity-efficiency trade-off, whereby providing support for lagging-behind regions
in the immediate-run may compromise concurrent attempts to enhancing national
growth. Our analysis, it is hoped, has helped identify the spatial growth context under
which this policy challenge may be taken up in the future.
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